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JURISDICTION 
A statement of this court's jurisdiction is set forth 
at page one of appellant's brief and is not contested by appellee 
Darin G. Woolstenhulme. 
ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW 
1. In light of the standard set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 
246 (Utah 1985), did Clark, as the party opposing summary 
judgment, meet his evidentiary burden to show that 
Woolstenhulme's conduct was a substantial causative factor of 
Clark's injuries? 
STANDARD OP REVIEW 
This court should: "review a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment under a 'correctness' standard, (Citations 
omitted.)11 Kitchen v. Cal Gas Company, Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 
(Utah App. 1991), cert. den. 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, ETC. 
Woolstenhulme submits that the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions, etc., is not determinative of the 
simple, narrow issue presented by Clark's appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was injured 
by the negligence of one or more of the defendants when, as a 
pedestrian, he: "was struck by one of the defendants' vehicles, 
or a combination of defendants' vehicles•" (R. 13, 14, f 25 of 
plaintiff's Complaint.) 
Course of Proceedings 
After the parties exchanged written discovery (R. 64, 
151, 152, 153, 154, 159, 196, 202, 263, 265, and 465.) and took 
the depositions of each of the defendants, other witnesses, the 
plaintiff, and plaintiff's experts (R. 432, 435, 612, 635, 176, 
188, 438, 451, 300, 415, 494), all defendants, including 
Woolstenhulme, moved for summary judgment. (R. 539) Each of the 
defendants moving for summary judgment conceded for purposes of 
the motion that they were negligent, but asserted that no jury, 
absent rank speculation, could determine that such negligence 
proximately caused Clark's injuries. (See, e.g., R. 539; R. 677, 
Woolstenhulme Addendum 000001-40.l) 
1
 Following the text of this brief and attached hereto is 
Woolstenhulme's Addendum (W. Add.). All pages of the Addendum are 
consecutively numbered at the lower right hand corner of the page. 
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Disposition in the Court Below 
Woolstenhulme was granted summary judgment on April 29, 
1993 because, as stated by the trial court: "Any finding as to 
proximate cause would be the result of speculation. This case, 
under plaintiff's present theories, would not only be problematic 
for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation 
to reach a verdict," (R. 675; W. Add. 000003.) 
Statement of Facts 
On the evening of December 10, 1989, Darin 
Woolstenhulme was driving up the on-ramp of 1-15 at the 
interchange with Highway 89 on his way home. (Woolstenhulme 
depo. p. 11 lines 13-17; W. Add. 000007.) The on-ramp had two 
lanes. When Mr. Woolstenhulme crested a hill, travelling in the 
right lane, he saw a small foreign car stopped in the right lane 
blocking his path. He tried to get in the left lane to get 
around the car. (Woolstenhulme depo. p. 11 lines 21-25; W. Add. 
000007.) As Mr. Woolstenhulme moved to the left, he struck Brad 
Gilbert, the owner of the small foreign car, who was at that time 
standing in the roadway approximately on top of the white-line 
separating the right and left hand lanes. (Woolstenhulme depo. 
p. 12 lines 1-7, p. 36 lines 1-25, p. 37 lines 1-10; W. Add. 
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000008, 000011, 000012; Brad Gilbert depo. p. 26 lines 5-17; W. 
Add. 000019.) 
Mr. Woolstenhulme began pumping his brakes trying to 
slow down because additional vehicles were stopped blocking the 
left hand lane, having already been involved in prior collisions. 
After slowing down, Mr. Woolstenhulme struck the rear end of a 
white station wagon stopped in the left lane. As a result of the 
impact, Mr. Woolstenhulme's vehicle spun sideways and stopped on 
the roadway. (Woolstenhulme depo. p. 12 lines 13-25, p. 13 lines 
1-7; W. Add. 000008-9.) Mr. Woolstenhulme was then struck from 
the rear by yet another vehicle. Woolstenhulme drew a diagram 
reflecting his understanding of the position of the various 
vehicles and such diagram was attached to his deposition as 
Exhibit 1. That diagram is attached hereto at Woolstenhulme 
Addendum 000017. At the time of the accident Mr. Woolstenhulme 
was driving a 1989 blue Chevrolet short bed pick-up truck. 
(Woolstenhulme depo. p. 14 lines 24-25; W. Add. 000010.) 
As Mr. Woolstenhulme was sitting in his truck waiting 
for the dust to settle, other collisions occurred. Specifically, 
a large four door vehicle (driven by defendant Colovich) struck a 
Jeep Cherokee (driven by defendant Hopkins) which had come to a 
stop near the accident scene. That collision pushed the Jeep 
Cherokee into a vehicle driven by defendant MacArthur (which had 
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spun out and impacted the guard rail) and in which Clark had been 
riding as a backseat passenger. (Woolstenhulme depo. at p. 43 
lines 17-25, p. 44 lines 1-25, p. 45 lines 1-10; W. Add. 000013-
15.) Thereafter numerous other collisions occurred, but 
Woolstenhulme was not really sure who hit whom. (Woolstenhulme 
depo. p. 45 lines 11-25, p. 46 lines 1-25; W. Add. 000015-16.) 
Afterward, Bradley Clark was discovered lying on the other side 
of the guard rail, down an embankment. 
No one saw how Bradley Clark was injured. 
(Woolstenhulme depo. at p. 33 lines 2-4; W. Add. 000010A.) 
Bradley Clark does not know how he was injured. (Clark 
depo. p. 61 lines 18-25; W. Add. 000021.) 
After the accident while Bradley Clark was laying in 
the ambulance next to Jennifer MacArthur, MacArthur related how 
she thought the accident occurred. As told by Bradley Clark, 
this is what she said: 
We were sitting in there and I said, "What 
happened?" She said, "Well, I think you got 
out of the car and got hit by my car." 
That's basically what she said. Now, that's 
all that I can be sure that I heard. 
(Clark depo. p. 62 lines 21-24; W. Add. 000022.) Clark filed his 
Complaint on April 7, 1991. No allegation of exactly which 
defendant's vehicle struck Clark, or how Clark was injured is 
contained in the Complaint. (R. 9) After some preliminary 
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discovery, Hopkins filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 227) 
In response to Hopkins' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Clark submitted an affidavit from Mr. Greg Duval dated February 
10, 1992. Mr. Duval, an accident reconstructionist, was hired by 
Mr. Clark to figure out what happened in the accident. At 
paragraph 16 of Mr. Duval's affidavit Duval stated under oath: 
16. It is my opinion that there are limited number of 
ways in which Brad Clark could have been injured in 
this accident. One of the most likely possibilities, 
to be established through further discovery, is that 
Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle after 
MacArthur was struck head on by Hopkins. 
(R. 251; W. Add. 000023/ 000026.) Thus Duval's affidavit 
identified Hopkins as a likely cause of Clark's injuries. 
After Hopkins' motion was denied, Duval was deposed. 
The deposition occurred over the course of two days, October 19, 
and October 23, and the transcript of the deposition is 159 pages 
long. Near the end of that deposition Mr. Duval was specifically 
asked if, without guessing or speculating, he could describe the 
mechanism or time of injury to Mr. Clark. He responded: "No.11 
The exact exchange is reprinted below: 
Q. Mr. Duval, without guessing or speculating, would 
you be able to tell me what the mechanism of 
injury was to Mr. Clark? 
A. No. 
Q. Without guessing or speculating, would you be able 
to tell me the sequence and time at which he 
sustained an injury? 
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A. No. 
Q. And I guess it's a fair statement, is it not, sir, 
that there's no further work that you could do 
which would enable you to answer that question? 
A. I don't think there is. 
(Duval depo. p. 156 lines 14-25, p. 157 lines 1-4; W. Add. 
000032-33.) 
Earlier in the same deposition Mr. Duval was 
specifically asked by counsel for Mr. Woolstenhulme if he could 
describe when Clark was hit. Mr. Duval responded that Clark was 
hit on one of two occasions and that his "primary guess" was that 
Clark was hit as a result of a chain reaction initiated by the 
Woolstenhulme vehicle, or that the other possibility was that 
Clark was hit when the MacArthur vehicle was struck first by the 
Hopkins' vehicle. The exact exchange is reprinted below: 
Q. When was he [Clark] hit? 
A. One of two times. One of two impacts. I would 
say my primary guess is, is that he exited the 
vehicle prior to the time that Woolstenhulme hit 
the MacArthur vehicle. He had already opened the 
door and stepped out. It's either the impact of 
the Woolstenhulme truck into the MacArthur 
vehicle, either the MacArthur vehicle struck him— 
if he was standing behind it and was knocked 
backwards, if there's some angular issue—or that 
the Woolstenhulme truck could have hit him as he 
was outside of the door, or he could be further 
back. He doesn't know. But that would be the 
impact of most significant force to the MacArthur 
vehicle was the one with the truck. 
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And then the other possibility is that the Jeep of 
Hopkins could have pushed the car back further 
after the Woolstenhulme impact. 
My primary guess is the Woolstenhulme impact 
caused Brad to get hit by either MacArthur's 
vehicle or Woolstenhulme7s truck. (Emphasis 
added.) 
(Duval depo. p. 58 lines 21-25, p. 59 lines 1-18; W. Add. 000030-
31.) 
On the day Duval's deposition concluded, Clark settled 
with defendant Hopkins. (R. 456) 
Thereafter, in response to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Woolstenhulme and others yet another affidavit of 
Greg Duval, this one dated April 12, 1993 was submitted to the 
court. This time, after acknowledging that he was not able to 
determine the exact mechanism of injury, Mr. Duval indicated that 
the most probable mechanism of injury was "the sequence of 
crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck." Mr. Duval goes on to 
state that: "The second most likely probability consists of the 
crash sequence caused by the Colovich automobile." (R. 631; W. 
Add. 000034-35.) No mention is made in Duval's second affidavit 
of the Hopkins' vehicle (Hopkins had by that time settled with 
the plaintiff) and no explanation is provided in the affidavit as 
to the change in expert Duval's testimony from his first 
affidavit and deposition testimony to his latest affidavit. (R. 
631; W. Add. 000034-37.) 
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Plaintiff's other expert, David Stephens had a 
different guess as to what happened. He testified in his 
deposition taken on December 21, 1992, that although he was not 
really sure which car hit Brad Clark, it could not have been the 
Woolstenhulme vehicle in any event. Relevant testimony is 
reprinted below: 
A. And when you think about it, if Clark 
had been hit first by the Buick before 
the Buick hit the Cherokee, than it's 
likely that he would have been pushed 
into the Cherokee and perhaps even 
crushed — between the Buick and the 
Cherokee. So that would make it more 
probable that it was the Cherokee that 
hit him. But even that is not a solid 
conclusion. It's based on the highest 
probability from the information that's 
available. 
I don't think it could have been Woolstenhulme 
because he was too far out in the road. It would 
have required a much greater angle of impact for 
him to have bumped Clark and caused Clark to fly 
over the guardrail. Because, as I said earlier, a 
vehicle travelling in one direction has a very 
difficult time hitting something and knocking it 
in any direction but the direction the vehicle is 
travelling. 
Q. Okay. So you think it is more likely that it is 
either Adamson (sic) in the Jeep or Colovich in 
the Buick; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But as you sit here today, you don't know which; 
is that right? 
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A. I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep, but 
I'm not certain. I can't say for sure. (Emphasis 
added,) 
(Stephens depo. p. 37 lines 25, p. 38 lines 1-25, p. 39 lines 1-
7; W. Add. 000039-40.) 
Thus, in summary, although neither of plaintiff's 
experts ever offered a solid expert opinion as to what happened 
in this accident, plaintiff's expert Greg Duval first testified 
in his affidavit that his best guess was that the accident was 
caused by the Hopkins' vehicle; then in his deposition changed 
his mind and decided his "primary guess11 was that the 
Woolstenhulme vehicle did it, or if that is not what happened 
then it was probably the Hopkins' vehicle; and then in his next 
affidavit decided that his best guess was that probably the 
Woolstenhulme vehicle was the cause or maybe, and for the first 
time, it was the Colovich vehicle. On the other hand, 
plaintiff's other expert David Stephens, who also could not say 
for sure which vehicle struck Clark, speculated that it was 
either Hopkins or Colovich, but not Woolstenhulme, (Duval's 
first affidavit, W. Add. 000023-28; Duval depo. p. 58 lines 21-
25, p. 59 lines 1-18, W. Add. 000030-31; Duval second affidavit, 
W. Add. 000034-37; Stephens depo. p. 37 line 25, p. 38 lines 1-
25, p. 39 lines 1-7, W. Add. 000039-40.) 
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After two years of litigation, over one thousand pages 
of deposition transcripts, two accident reconstructionists, 
written discovery and investigation, plaintiff was not able to 
submit to the court a single shred of direct evidence 
establishing that plaintiff Clark was even hit by a vehicle in 
the accident, let alone that his injuries (which may have been 
caused by diving over the guardrail) were proximately caused by 
the negligence, if any, of Darin Woolstenhulme. (R. 631) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In order to defeat Woolstenhulme's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Clark was required to come forward with credible, 
admissible evidence to establish: "a direct causal connection 
between [Woolstenhulme's] alleged negligence and the injury." 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff was obligated to come forward with evidence (not just 
allegations) that would have allowed the jury to reach a 
conclusion as to the potential causal connection between 
Woolstenhulme's alleged negligence and Clark's injury without 
engaging in speculation. For "when the proximate cause of an 
injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of 
law." Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 
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680, 684 (Utah 1982), as set forth in Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246. 
Clark failed to present such evidence to the trial court. 
To defeat summary judgment, Clark relied entirely on an 
affidavit from Greg Duval submitted with Clark's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. No other evidence on the issue 
of causation was submitted. The affidavit of Duval (aside from 
failing to establish the requisite causal connection because it 
speaks only in terms of probabilities without quantifying those 
probabilities) should be ignored by this court just as it was 
ignored by the trial court because it conflicts, without any 
explanation offered in the affidavit, with both an earlier 
affidavit of Duval and his deposition testimony. In Utah, when 
testimony is presented in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment which conflicts with prior testimony, unless the 
subsequent testimony includes an adequate explanation for the 
discrepancy, the subsequent testimony should be ignored. Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). 
Additionally, Clark's expert's "primary guess" is not 
admissible expert testimony and therefore, could not be relied 
upon by Clark to defeat summary judgment. Norton v. Blackham, 
669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (affidavit must set forth 
admissible testimony to be considered); Highland Construction 
Company v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 
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(Utah 1984) (a logical nexus between an expert's opinion and the 
facts must be established). 
The unexplained conflicting guesses of Clark's expert 
would leave the jury in this case with nothing upon which to base 
a conclusion as to proximate cause except speculation based upon 
speculation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CLARK FAILED TO PRESENT ADEQUATE EVIDENCE 
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO ESTABLISH THAT 
A JURY COULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OP 
PROXIMATE CAUSE ABSENT SPECULATION 
What Clark was Required to Submit to the Trial Court: 
While, as Clark has pointed out in his brief, summary 
judgment is generally improper on the issue of causation, in 
appropriate circumstances, summary judgment may be granted on the 
issue of proximate cause. Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, 611 P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980). Utah 
courts have not been reluctant to grant summary judgment, and to 
uphold the grant of summary judgment, in proper cases involving 
negligence. See, Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 
(Utah 1991); Mitchell, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985); Preston v. Lamb, 
436 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Utah 1968); Kitchen v. Cal Gas Company, 821 
P.2d 458, 460-61 (Utah App. 1991). 
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In this case, in order to withstand defendant 
Woolstenhulme's Motion for Summary Judgment, Clark was required 
to come forward with evidence that established a direct causal 
connection between Woolstenhulme's negligence and Clark's alleged 
injury. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245. Clark must have submitted 
some direct evidence on the issue of causation in order for the 
jury to resolve that issue absent speculation. Without such 
direct evidence (recognizing that the evidence need not be 
ultimately persuasive, but only adequate to provide the jury a 
rational foundation upon which to base an opinion), Clark's claim 
fails as a matter of law. Id. at 246. Even though inferences 
must be resolved in Clark's favor, Clark cannot now, and could 
not before the trial court rely on naked assertions, unsupported 
by facts, to establish a prima facie case (which includes 
proximate cause) against Woolstenhulme. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 
461. Furthermore, Clark could not rely on an affidavit which set 
forth testimony in conflict with earlier sworn testimony unless 
an acceptable explanation for the conflict was provided. Webster 
v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). If the evidence 
submitted by Clark to defeat summary judgment conflicts with 
earlier sworn testimony and no explanation is provided, the 
subsequent testimony must be ignored. Id. at 1173. 
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Clark cannot rely on Duval's April 12, 1993 affidavit 
testimony which conflicts with both his February 10, 1992 
affidavit and his October 19 and 23, 1992 deposition because no 
explanation is offered in the subsequent affidavit which resolves 
the conflicts. Clark cannot submit the testimony of his expert, 
Duval, to the effect that the accident was caused most probably 
by defendant Hopkins, when trying to defeat Hopkins' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and then, after settling with Hopkins, submit 
Duval's new and revised testimony to the effect that either 
Woolstenhulme or Colovich caused the accident when trying to 
defeat Woolstenhulme and Colovich's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court, probably in recognition of the sometimes 
rather mercurial nature of the opinions of experts, has held that 
subsequent testimony which conflicts with prior testimony cannot 
be used to defeat a motion for summary judgment absent a sound 
explanation for the discrepancy. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d at 
1173. 
What Clark Actually Submitted to the Trial Court; 
The only evidence, direct or otherwise, submitted by 
Clark on the issue of causal connection between Woolstenhulme's 
conduct and Clark's injuries was the affidavit of Greg Duval 
signed April 12, 1993. (W. Add. 000034-37.) That affidavit sets 
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forth no new facts and sets forth no explanation as to why 
Duval's opinion has changed from his first affidavit; when he 
testified under oath that the Hopkins vehicle was the most likely 
cause of the accident (W. Add. 000026.)/ or when he testified in 
his deposition that he did not know the mechanism of injury but 
that his best guess was either the Woolstenhulme vehicle or the 
Hopkins vehicle. (W. Add. 000030-31.) 
Quite understandably Clark did not submit to the trial 
court (although defendant Woolstenhulme did) the alleged opinions 
of the other expert hired by Clark, David Stephens, who testified 
that although he could not tell for sure what caused the accident 
(maybe it was Colovich, maybe it was Hopkins), it was not 
Woolstenhulme. (W. Add. 000039-40.) 
Why Clark's Evidence was Inadequate: 
First, even if this court decides to consider Duval's 
April 12, 1993 affidavit, along with Duval's deposition and his 
first affidavit, and along with Stephens' conflicting testimony, 
Woolstenhulme submits that if all such evidence were presented to 
a jury, that jury would be hopelessly confused and could not, 
absent speculation, resolve the issue of who, if anyone's, 
negligence caused Clark's injury. No evidence was submitted as 
to how or where or which car, or when in the sequence of events, 
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Clark was struck, if he was struck at all. Just as in Mitchell 
v. Pearson Enterprises, supra, it is plaintiff's failure to 
present evidence of a link between Woolstenhulme's negligence 
(which was never precisely identified) and Clark's injuries which 
justifies summary judgment for Woolstenhulme. 
One of Clark's experts testified that it was not 
Woolstenhulme that struck Clark and the other expert first 
testified that it was Hopkins that most probably struck Clark, 
then testified that he did not know the mechanism of injury but 
that his "best guess" was that it was probably Woolstenhulme, but 
maybe Hopkins, and then in a later affidavit testified that it 
was probably Woolstenhulme but maybe Colovich. (W. Add. 000023-
28, 30-31, 34-37.) Just as in Mitchell there were no eye 
witnesses with knowledge pertinent to the issue of causation and 
just as in Mitchell experts' hypotheses of several alternative 
series of events, some which might implicate defendant and some 
which would not, were inadequate to overcome defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246. (In Mitchell, 
plaintiff submitted to the Court the fact that there were no 
signs of forced entry into Mitchell's room and then argued that 
it must be inadequate security which allowed a murderer to enter 
Mitchell's hotel room and kill him. The Utah Supreme Court 
responded, that such evidence could also be indicative of entry 
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by a friend or colleague of Mitchell's and in any event such 
conclusions were not supported by direct evidence. Id.) 
Woolstenhulme is not suggesting that Clark is 
prohibited from presenting alternative theories to the jury. 
Clark may present alternative theories to the jury, but each of 
his theories must be supported by something more than the 
unsubstantiated conflicting guesses which were submitted in this 
case. 
Second, the Court should ignore the April 12, 1993 
affidavit of Duval upon which Clark relies to defeat summary 
judgment (and as authority for many of the factual assertions in 
his brief), because Duval's unsupported opinion set forth therein 
conflicts, without any explanation, with Duval's earlier 
affidavit and with his deposition testimony. In his first 
affidavit, Duval swears that it was most probably the Hopkins 
Jeep that caused the accident; then in his October 1992 
deposition, he testified that he did not know, absent guessing or 
speculating, what the mechanism of injury was, but that it was 
probably either Woolstenhulme or Hopkins; then, in his April 12, 
1993 affidavit Duval swears that the accident was most probably 
caused by Woolstenhulme and the next most likely cause was 
Colovich. (W. Add. 000023-28, 30-31, 34-37.) No explanation is 
offered in the final affidavit for the discrepancies in 
18 
testimony. As such, the affidavit should be ignored. Webster, 
supra, 675 P.2d at 1173. Without the final Duval affidavit, no 
evidence remains to establish the requisite causal link. 
Third, both Duval and Stephens testified that they did 
not know what caused Clark's injuries. Duval was asked in his 
deposition the following clear, concise question: 
Q. Mr. Duval, without guessing or speculating, 
would you be able to tell me what the 
mechanism of injury was to Mr. Clark? 
A. No. 
Q. Without guessing or speculating, would you be 
able to tell me the sequence and time at 
which he sustained an injury? 
A. No. 
(Duval depo. p. 156 lines 14-25; W. Add. 000032.) Likewise, when 
expert Stephens was asked who hit Clark, he was unable to choose 
between Adamson (sic) in the Jeep or Colovich in the Buick. He 
testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. So you think it is more likely that it 
is either Adamson in the Jeep or Colovich in 
the Buick; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But as you sit here today, you don't know 
which; is that right? 
A. I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep, 
but I'm not certain. I can't say for sure. 
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(Stephens depo. p. 38 line 25, p. 39 lines 1-7; W. Add. 000039-
40.) 
Such expert testimony is worthless as evidence. It is 
no more than the unsubstantiated speculation of two accident 
reconstructionists who simply do not know what happened. The 
logical nexus between the experts' testimony and the facts has 
not be established; the basis in terms of facts or data of the 
expert testimony has not been provided. Both are required. 
Guesses and speculation are not evidence. Highland Construction 
Company v. Union Pacific Railroad, 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 
1984) . The trial court properly concluded that this case: 
"Would not only be problematic for a jury, it would require 
jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach a verdict." (R. 
677; W. Add. 000003.) 
CONCLUSION 
Woolstenhulme respectfully requests this court to 
affirm the trial court's ruling which granted summary judgment to 
Woolstenhulme. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT<<3j_ | ' 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, et al., 
Defendant. 
AMENDED RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by 
Defendants Farmer's Insurance Exchange, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, MacArthur, Colovich, Hopkins, Gilbert and Woostenhulm. On April 15, 1993, 
the Court heard oral argument on the motions. The Court, having duly considered the 
arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
A motion for summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.Pro 
56. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must allege facts 
sufficient to support a finding of (1) a duty to plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, (3) a causal 
link between the negligent conduct of the defendant and the injury suffered by plaintiff, and 
(4) damages. The issue before the Court is, given the facts as alleged by plaintiff, whether 
000001 
plaintiffs allegations can support a finding of proximate causation as to each defendant. For 
the purpose of summary judgment only, the Court will assume without deciding that plaintiff 
has alleged sufficient facts to prove negligent conduct on the part of the defendants. 
Proximate causation can be defined as "that cause which, in natural and continuous 
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without 
which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Mitchell at 245-46. Additionally, 
plaintiff bears the burden to show initially that the defendants conduct was a "substantial 
causative factor" leading to plaintiffs injury. Mitchell at 246. 
This case can be compared to the facts in Mitchell. In Mitchell, plaintiffs brought a 
wrongful death action after Mr. Mitchell was found dead in his hotel room. Plaintiffs were 
successful in alleging facts sufficient to establish negligent conduct but the court determined 
that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any direct evidence linking Mitchell's death and the 
alleged negligent conduct. The court found that since there was an absence of direct 
evidence on causation, the jury would be left to speculation. Mitchell at 246. The court 
stated that "[w]hen proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim fails as a 
matter of law." Id.; Staheli v. Farmers' Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1982). 
While it is true that the issue of proximate cause is generally considered a question of 
fact, the court may take the question away from the factfinder when appropriate. Mitchell 
2 
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v. Pearson Enterprises. 687 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). See also Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp.. 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah App. 1991). If reasonable inferences can be 
drawn from the evidence, then the matter should be put to the factfinder. Steffensen. at 486. 
But in the absence of proof on the issue of causation, there is no evidence upon which a jury 
could make reasonable inferences and hence the jury would be left to speculate on the issue 
of causation. 
After considering the arguments and extensive briefs presented by counsel, the Court 
determines that as to defendants Farmer's Insurance, State Farm Insurance, Mac Arthur, 
Colovich, Hopkin, and Woolstenhulme no direct evidence exists on the issue of causation as 
to these defendants. In fact, plaintiffs own expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition 
whether he would be able to determine the mechanism of plaintiffs injury without 
speculating or guessing. His response was "no." 
This Court has been unable to determine from the arguments presented any exact 
mechanism for plaintiffs injury. The Court finds that any finding as to proximate cause 
would be the result of speculation. This case, under plaintiffs present theories, would not 
only be problematic for a jury, it would require jurors to engage in rank speculation to reach 
a verdict. That result would not be fair, nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties. 
Accordingly, the Court grants these defendants 's Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
Court denies defendant Gilbert's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Dated at Provo, this^Z day of ,Sr/?^r ^ » 1993-
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BY THE COURT 
^t&tge Lynn W. Davis 
cc: James G. Clark, Esq. 
Richard K. Spratley, Esq. 
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq. 
Michael P. Zaccheo, Esq. 
Aaron Alma Nelson, Esq. 
Paul M. Belnap, Esq. 
D. Richard Smith, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UT 
BRADLEY CLARK 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
FARMER'S INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
et. al., 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 910400220 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The Court has recently entered a ruling in the the above case. The Court has granted 
summary judgment to all the defendants, except defendant Gilbert. The Court inadvertently 
failed to include defendant Woolstenhulme motion for summary judgment as being included 
in the granting of summary judgment. The Court will include an Amended Ruling on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment which includes the granting of summary 
judgment to defendant Woolstenhulme. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
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et al., 
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October 22, 1992 
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203 Kress Building 
40 South 100 West 
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Q (BY MR. CLARK) Tell me-- We're 
discussing an accident that happened about-- I 
believe December 10, 1989, in which my client, 
Bradley Clark was injured. 
If you would, please, tell me, in your 
words, how you happened to be involved in this. 
A Meaning what? 
MR. ZACCHEO: You want to know where 
he was going or what happened in the accident? 
Q (BY MR. CLARK) What happened in the 
accident? 
A I wasn't sure what you wanted. 
I just left my girlfriend's house at the 
time, was heading home. I had been at a 
complete stop at a red stop light before heading 
up the on-ramp or the access road that connects 
U.S. 89 to 1-15. 
As I come up over the top-- it's a rounded 
type of road on top of it. I was in the 
right-hand lane. 
And as soon as I got on top where I could 
actually see down the other side, there was the 
small foreign car in the same lane at a dead 
stop. I immediately tried to get in the left 
lane to get around the car. 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 000007 
11 As I moved into the left lane, started to 
2 go past the car, there was an individual 
3 standing probably right on top of the white 
4 line. Probably-- I don't know. Real close to 
5 the car that was stalled in the lane. Tried to 
6 get around him. Didn't have enough time to do 
7 so. 
81 My truck struck this individual. He went 
9 up over the right-hand side of my truck, rolled 
10 off the hood, over the windshield and somewhere 
11 over behind me. I have no idea where. Just over 
12 the right side. 
13 At that time I was trying to get back 
14 around the car in the right lane. Looked up. 
15 There was more cars in the left lane, but 
16 stalled, stopped. Was pumping my brakes trying 
17 to slow down and struck the rear end of a white 
18 station wagon. 
191 Q What part of your car made contact with 
20 what part of the white station wagon? 
21 A Basically the front end of my truck 
22 struck the rear end of the station wagon 
23 tailgate. 
24 Q At some point your car, as I understand 
25 it, became sideways on the road. Was that 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 000U08 
1 subsequent to the collision? 
2 A As far as I know, yeah. I was pretty 
3 much headed south when I struck the vehicle. 
4 But in the process of striking it--the force--I 
5 don't-- You know, I don't really know. 
6 When it came to a rest, I was facing more 
7 of an easterly direction. 
8 Q The damage to your car, was that pretty 
9 much across the front of the grill? 
10 A I had damage across the front of my 
11 grill and down both sides of my vehicle in the 
12 total cab area. The bed of the truck was 
13 untouched. 
14 Q Mr. Woolstenhulme, when did you first 
15 become aware that a crash was going to happen? 
16 A Basically as soon as I saw the first 
17 car in the right-hand lane. 
18 Q And you managed to avoid that car, 
19 didn't you? 
20 A I did. But there had been--
21 As I missed that car--and like I said, 
22 there was two cars in front of me that already 
23 had hit eachother. So the accident had already 
24 occurred at that point. 
25 Q Okay. 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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And when you came upon the scene there were 
basically three cars that were on the road? 
A Yes, there was. 
Q You mentioned that you stopped at a red 
light prior to entering onto the on-ramp area. 
Were there any cars in front of you at the 
red light? 
A No. I was the first car at the line. 
There was a car lane-- left lane right next to 
me . 
Q What kind of car was that? 
A It was a Jeep Cherokee. 
Q Do you recall any other cars at the 
stop light? 
A There was cars behind me. But other 
than that, that's all I know. 
Q All of you stopped at the light? 
A Yes . 
Q So at least three cars that you were 
aware of that were stopped at the light? 
A Yes. 
Q Describe your truck for me, if you 
would, please. 
A It was a 1989 Chevrolet, extended cab, 
four-wheel drive, short bed. Blue on top and 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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A Yes . 
Q Did you hear anybody saying anything 
that would indicate how Brad was struck? 
A I did not, 
Q Was there anybody with you? 
A No. 
Q Were you injured in any way? 
A No, I was not. 
Q Any idea who notified the police? 
A I don't have any idea. 
Q I understand that you were a party to a 
meeting with the police that took place several 
days after the accident. 
A Yes . 
Q Can you tell me what you related to the 
investigating police officer at that time? 
A Basically I-- It was a long time ago. I 
just don't remember. 
Q Do you remember what anybody else said 
about what happened? 
A I do not. Just everybody kind of 
discussed what they thought had happened. 
Q As you drove up the on-ramp— after the 
light turned green, or whatever, and you 
proceeded up the on-ramp-- did you notice any 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 000010A 
for sure. 
Q When you went over to the-- I guess you 
call it the right-side of the guardrail-- the 
westside of the guardrail-- to talk with the 
person that you saw get off the road and go 
across, did you talk with anybody else there? 
That is, was he there alone, or was he with 
other people? 
A As I walked that direction, he walked 
up to me and basically made a comment that I had 
struck him. And I said, " Yeah, I did." And I 
asked him if he was okay. I was pretty shook up 
that I had hit someone. He said, "Yeah, I'm 
fine." And that was pretty much the 
conversation. 
Q Did he indicate he actually saw your 
vehicle strike him? 
A Again, as far as I recall, he said, 
" You struck me." " You hit me", I believe is 
probably what he said. 
Q And he indicated at that time that he 
was okay? 
A Said he was a little shook up. 
One of his knees hurt. I don't recall 
which one. That was about it. 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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Q Are you aware of anybody who 
witnessed-- who either actually witnessed or 
claims to have witnessed the accident or the 
collision between you and the pedestrian? 
A Just himself and myself, as far as I 
know. 
Q When you talked to-- I guess it was Mr. 
Gilbert-- did he indicate how your vehicle 
struck him? 
A No. He just said, " You struck me." 
Q What was the weather like as you were 
driving towards the accident that evening? 
A As--
Q I understand you had only been on the 
road for three miles or so. But what was the 
weather like? 
A As I stated before, the road was wet. 
The weather was cloudy, but nothing was falling 
Q Okay. 
Did you have your windshield wipers on? 
A No . 
Q Picking up road spray from other 
vehicles that you recall? 
A Not that I recall, no. 
Q Do you recall what time the collision 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR Q0G012 
1 of the speed of your vehicle at the time it made 
2 contact for the first time with another vehicle? 
3| A Maybe half of what I was going, 20 
4 miles-an-hour.. But I have no idea. It's a 
5 guess. 
6 Q And again, the speed of your vehicle at 
7 the time you made contact with the pedestrian? 
81 A Again, I'd have to guess. I don't know. 
9 Q Okay. 
10 Slower than you were going when you hit the 
11 car? 
12 A No. I'd say probably a little faster. 
13 Q Did you witness any other collisions 
14 that evening? 
15 A Sort of. 
16 Q Tell me what you saw. 
17 A Well, I witnessed the Sprint hit me. I 
18 also witnessed-- I believe it was a big 
19 four-door. I don't know what it was. I believe 
20 it hit-- I think that was the car, I don't 
21 know. Some car hit the back end of the Cherokee 
22 and pushed the Cherokee into the red car. 
23 Q Did you see the collision between the 
24 sedan that hit the Cherokee-- I mean, between 
25 the sedan and the Cherokee? Did you see those 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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two cars collide? 
A I saw a car strike the back of the 
Cherokee, I think it was big four-door. It was 
just, you know, quick. But I saw the Cherokee 
be pushed forward into the red car, 
Q Did it appear to be--
I'm sorry. Did you see any other cars hit 
the Cherokee? 
A Not to my recollection, no. 
Q How long after you came to a stop did 
the Cherokee and this other vehicle collide? 
A Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you a 
timeframe. It was long enough that, you know, I 
could-- I was sitting there and I could see 
what was where. Other than that, I don't know a 
timeframe. 
Q Minutes or seconds? 
A It would have probably have been-- I'd 
say at least a minute. 
Q And did you see any other vehicle hit 
the Jeep? 
A I did not. 
Q What movement did the Jeep take as a 
result of the contact with the car you 
described? 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 A It was a complete stop when I first saw 
2 it. I looked out and could see people sitting in 
3 the car. Whatever vehicle struck it pushed it 
4 forward. South. 
5 Q How far south did it go? 
6 A I don't know the distance. I have no 
7 idea. Several feet. 
81 Q The Jeep then collided with the red 
9 car, didn't it? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Did the Jeep hit anything else that 
12 you're aware of? 
13 A I believe it slid down the guardrail. 
14 But I don't know for sure. 
15 Q Did you witness any other collisions? 
16 A There was lots of collisions going on 
17 after me. I could look out my window and see 
18 other cars kind of hitting. But what was 
19 hitting what, I have no idea. 
20 Q Tell me what you saw that you recall. 
21 A I remember some car, I believe, hit the 
22 Datsun-- the original car that had been in the 
23 right-hand lane. 
24 Q Do you recall what part of that car hit 
25 what part of the Datsun? 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 000015 
1 A I don't. I have no idea. Maybe the 
2 rear of it. But that's a guess. I don't know. 
3 Q Do you recall what car hit the Datsun? 
41 A I do not. 
5 Q Do you recall where both of those cars 
6 went after the collision between them? 
7 A I have no idea. 
8 Q Did the Datsun appear to move at all 
9 after the collision? 
10 A It definitely slid south and probably 
11 to the right. But other than that, I don't know 
12 how far or exactly where it came to rest. 
13 Q And the car that crashed into it, did 
14 you see what happened to that vehicle after the 
15 collision? 
16 A I believe it was facing east to have 
17 turned it. But other than that, I don't know. 
18 Q Do you remember at any time a vehicle 
19 passing behind your car? 
20 A There was one vehicle that came through 
21 and didn't hit anything, to my knowledge. To my 
22 knowledge, I just remember-- I believe it was--
23 it seemed like it was one of those little 
24 mini-van type of things. But it actually kind 
25 of maneuvered through and didn't hit any cars 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 kinda my standard attire at the time. 
2 Q Do you remember seeing any actual 
3 collisions? That is, any two vehicles actually 
4 running into each other? 
5 A I remember seeing-- it seemed to be a 
6 little Sprint hitting the truck that hit me, the 
7 Chevy. 
8 Q Okay. 
9 A Four by four. 
10 Q And I'm sorry. That's what I was going 
11 to ask you. 
12 Do you know what vehicle hit you? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Go ahead. 
15 A It was a Chevy pickup truck, a four by 
16 four. I believe it was a three-quarter ton 
17 light blue, late 80's, early 90's. 
18 MR. PETERSON: Close enough? 
19 MR. ZACCHEO: That's it. 
20 Q (BY MR. CLARK) And do you recall 
21 where you were standing at the time you were 
22 hit? 
23 A I don't recall exactly, no. I was 
24 fairly close to the car-- the hispanic lady I 
25 was talking to. But I don't recall exactly where 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 the last thing I remember. 
2 Q Can you describe this gentleman, how he looked? 
3 A I have no idea — it was just like dark. That's 
4 all I can see. I see his car — it seems like I can see his 
5 car over in the background and I just see him walking across 
6 the road kind of like a silhouette type of thing. 
7 Q He was walking toward you? 
8 A Yeah. 
9 Q Do you have a clear recollection of him saying, 
10 I'm sorry, I'm sorry. My car was stalled on the road? 
11 A Yeah. For some reason I definitely hear that he 
12 says, I can't get it started or something. 
13 Q Is it your best guess that the reason you got out 
14 of the car is to go help him? 
15 A Yeah, definitely. That's definitely what I was 
16 thinking is, this guy has got to get his car out of the road 
17 or someone is really going to get hurt, and then that's it. 
18 Q You don't remember anything else at the scene of 
19 the accident? 
20 A I remember reaching for the door and then I 
21 blacked out. 
22 Q Do you remember anything else at the scene of the 
23 accident? 
24 A I remember waking up on a stretcher and being put 
25 in the ambulance. 
61 
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Q Do you remember talking with anyone else at the 
scene of the accident? Any other conversation that you were 
part of or heard? 
A Yeah. I remember getting into the ambulance. 
They put me in the ambulance and Jennifer was in there next 
to me and her mouth was wired shut or something and I was 
asking — I was trying to joke to make her feel comfortable 
about that, trying to relax what was going on. I'm sure she 
was pretty upset. And I asked her what happened, because I 
didn't even know. I couldn't remember anything. She said 
something like I got out of the car and got hit by a car, 
came down and hit her car and got hit by a car and flipped 
over the guardrail, and that's all I can remember. 
Q Let's back up. She gave you some explanation of 
her version of what happened — 
A Yeah. 
Q — as you were in the ambulance. 
A Yes. 
Q Can you slowly, so we make sure the court reporter 
gets it, give me, as best you recall, of what she said. 
A We were sitting in there and I said, What 
happened? She said, Well, I think you got out of the car and 
got hit by my car. That's basically what she said. Now, 
that's all that I can be sure that I heard. 
Q All right. 
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BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
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FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
HOPKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND/OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE 
Civil No. 910400220 
Judge: George E. Ballif 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Lt. Greg DuVal, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I was retained by counsel for the Plaintiff as an 
expert witness and as a forensic expert regarding the issues of 
accident investigation and reconstruction in the multiple vehicle 
automobile crash at issue in this action. 
2. That I am presently employed as a lieutenant with the 
Provo City Police Department in Provo, Utah. 
3. That since 1985 I have been President of my own company, 
DuVal Investigations and Accident Reconstruction, a private 
0001)23 
consulting business. 
4. That I hold a B.S. Degree in Police Science, Law 
Enforcement and Justice Administration from Brigham Young 
University, receiving said degree in 1979. 
5. That I have received post-graduate education specifically 
associated with accident reconstruction from Utah State Police 
Officer's Standard and Training, Northwestern University Traffic 
Institute. I have engaged in extensive self study, and I am a 
member in good standing of the Society of Accident 
Reconstructionists's (SOAR). 
6. That in the course of my police work and my private 
consulting business I have investigated thousands of automobile 
accidents and recostructed hundreds of automobile accidents. 
7. That I have qualified as an expert accident 
reconstructionist on numerous occasions in District and Circuit 
Courts for the State of Utah. 
8. I have certified and testified as an expert witness 
before every division in the Fourth District Court. 
9. That as an expert in the areas of accident investigation 
and reconstruction, I usually and ordinarily rely upon physical 
evidence obtained at the scene of the accident, photographs of 
damages to the vehicles, statements obtained from the witnesses, 
personal interviews, a review of affidavits, interrogatories, 
2 
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requests for production and depositions in cases. 
10. In this case I have done all of the above. I have 
visited the scene of the incident and I have taken photographs. I 
have obtained photographs from the Utah Highway Patrol taken before 
any cars were moved from the scene. I have obtained and reviewed 
the police investigative report and witnesses statements contained 
therewith. I have seen witness statements obtained by insurance 
adjusters, reviewed the depositions taken in this case and I have 
personally conducted interviews with Rita Kennedy, Brad Clark, 
Daren Woolstenhulme, David Adamson, Don Colovich, and Gordon 
Holbrook. All interviews were with parties to this case and are 
foundational and constitute admissions by parties. 
11. Based upon my review of all the above materials in this 
case, and particularly the investigative officer's report and 
interviews with Adamson and Colovich, it is my opinion at this time 
that the Hopkins vehicle never came to a stop prior to colliding 
with the MacArthur vehicle in a head-on fashion. 
12. Based upon the statements of Adamson, Colovich, Hopkins, 
the investigating police officer and particularly the photographs 
taken by the Utah Highway Patrol before any of the vehicles had 
been moved, Defendant Hopkins vehicle crashed in to MacArthur's 
vehicle in a head-on fashion. 
13. Based upon the information I have available at this time, 
3 
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it is my opinion that the incident did not happen as provided in 
Hopkins1 affidavit. That is inconsistent with the physical 
evidence in this case and with the statements which have been 
provided. 
14. The evidence provided by Hopkins and the Utah Highway 
Patrol photographs indicate that Hopkins made contact with at least 
three cars including MacArthur. 
15. Based upon my investigation and review of all materials 
in this case, it is my opinion that Defendant Hopkins was one of 
the prime players in this accident. There is insufficient evidence 
at this time to rule out liability on Hopkins, and in fact there 
appears to be some liability on him. 
16. It is my opinion that there are limited number of ways in 
which Brad Clark could have been injured in this accident. One of 
the most likely possibilities, to be established through further 
discovery, is that Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle 
after MacArthur was struck head-on by Hopkins. 
17. In my interview with Defendant Adamson he told me that 
he was following Hopkins on the roadway, Hopkins began to break and 
slide sideways and Defendant Adamson's vehicle made contact with 
Hopkins1 vehicle. As Adamson's vehicle spun around he saw the 
Hopkins vehicle make head on contact with the MacArthur vehicle. 
18. It is my opinion that Hopkins1 attempt to stop in the 
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middle of the freeway on-ramp may have been negligent and caused 
the collision with MacArthur's car, 
19. Defendant Colovich told me in his interview that he 
collided with the back of the Hopkins1 vehicle. While this is 
consistent with Hopkins1 claim that he was struck twice from 
behind, it is inconsistent that the collision took place over an 
approximate two minute period as Hopkins claims. 
20. Further, Rita Kennedy related in her interview that she 
saw the semi and the MacArthur car approaching and jumped over the 
guard rail. Rita had been over the guard rail for a few seconds 
when Brad Clark came flying over the guard rail landing nearby. 
Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later two men came over the 
guard rail to help Brad. Daren Woolstenhulme said that was he and 
Mr. Hopkins (from the jeep). 
21. I have not been able to interview Mr. Hopkins, he has not 
provided a statement, photographs, or a deposition in this case. 
In the absence of obtaining information from Hopkins, 
Woolstenhulme, Colovich, and Gilbert, I am unable to exclude 
Defendant Hopkins either as a negligent party or as a cause of the 
injury suffered by Brad Clark in this case. 
For further affiant saith not. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /C day of February, 1992. 
Lt. Greg—kuVal 
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1 now further south than the front of the 
2 Macarthur vehicle. 
3 Q By how much? 
4 A Several feet. However, I'm not sure how 
5 far the Sprint pushed the truck westward nor how 
6 much the collision force of the Jeep to the 
7 Sentra had as far as pushing the Sentra either. 
8 So they were fairly close proximity to eachother 
9 after the rotation but before the subsequent 
10 impacts. They'd be fairly close. We're 
11 dickering over a couple of feet here. 
12 Q The passenger side of the Woolstenhulme 
13 truck and the front of the Macarthur vehicle? 
14 A We're talking just about a few feet 
15 difference one way ot the other. It's not a big 
16 difference. 
17 Q Has Brad Clark been hit yet, in your 
18 opinion? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q When was he hit? 
21 A One of two times. 
22 MS. CLEGG: Excuse me. One what? 
23 THE WITNESS: One of two impacts. 
24 I would say my primary guess is, is that he 
25 exited the vehicle prior to the time that 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 Woolstenhulme hit the Macarthur vehicle. He had 
2 already opened the door and stepped out. 
3 It's either the impact of the Woolstenhulme 
4 truck into the Macarthur vehicle, either the 
5 Macarthur vehicle struck him-- if he was 
6 standing behind it and was knocked backwards, if 
7 there's some angular issue-- or that the 
8 Woolstenhulme truck could have hit him as he was 
9 outside of the door, or he could be further 
10 back. He doesn't know. But that would be the 
11 impact of most significant force to the 
12 Macarthur vehicle was the one with the truck. 
13 And then the other possibility is that the 
14 Jeep of Hopkins could have pushed the car back 
15 further after the Woolstenhulme impact. 
16 My primary guess is the Woolstenhulme 
17 impact caused Brad to get hit by either 
18 Macarthur's vehicle or Woolstenhulme's truck. 
19 Q (BY MR. ZACCHEO) Was that before or 
20 after the Woolstenhulme truck hits Gilbert? 
21 A I would say that those two events 
22 happened at nearly the same time. 
23 We're going to split this down to some 
24 hairs at this point, in that I think that 
25 Macarthur was hit before Gilbert was hit. And 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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1 driver's side of her vehicle-- because it had 
2 spun around-- would be virtually right on that 
3 yellow line; is that right? 
41 A That would be correct. 
5 Q And for Mr. Clark to exit the vehicle, 
6 he would have had to have stepped onto the 
7 travel portion of the roadway? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q Okay. 
10 MR. JEFFS: That's all the questions I 
11 have. 
12 EXAMINATION 
13 BY MR. BELNAP: 
14 Q Mr. DuVal# without guessing or 
15 speculating, would you be able to tell me what 
16 the mechanism of injury was to Mr. Clark? 
17 A No. 
18 Q Without guessing or speculating, would 
19 you be able to tell me the sequence and time at 
20 which he sustained an injury? 
21 A From when he exited the vehicle to when 
22 injury occurred? 
23 Q Yes. 
24 A No. 
25 Q And I guess it's a fair statement, is 
Lesley Nelson -- CSR 
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it not, sir, that there's no further work that 
you could do which would enable you to answer 
that question? 
A I don't think that there is. 
Q Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the deposition was concluded at 
12:15 p.m.) 
* * * 
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/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Greg DuVal being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That I am an accident reconstructionist hired by 
Plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. That my qualifications were previously set out in an 
affidavit in opposition to Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary 
judgment herein and the same is incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
3. That I have qualified as an expert witness in every 
division of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
4. That I interviewed Rita Kennedy, and her information was 
000034 
helpful. She did not provide temporal and spacial measurements 
which she is capable of providing enabling us to determine with 
relative certainty the exact mechanism of Brad Clark's injury. 
5. We have always maintained that it is impossible with the 
information available to determine the exact mechanism of 
Plaintiff's injuries. The best we can do is to come up with 
probabilities. I feel the most probable mechanism of the injuries 
was the sequence of crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck. 
6. The second most likely probability consists of the crash 
sequence caused by the Colovich automobile. 
7. I can provide with virtual certainty that one or the 
other of these events directly caused the collision with Plaintiff. 
8. All Defendants remaining in this case contributed in some 
way to the crash events. 
9. That the factual basis upon which I make these 
determinations are contained in my deposition and prior Affidavits 
and attachments filed in this case, and I incorporate them herein 
by this reference. 
10. I do not think it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to have 
exited the MacArthur vehicle. Plaintiff testified that Gilbert was 
in trouble and asking for help. The occupants of Plaintiff's car 
were injured, by a collision with Woolstenhulme, while in the car. 
The MacArthur car was not a place of relative safety. 
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Wherefore further affiant saith naught. 
DATED AND SIGNED this J_2_ day of April, 1993 
Greg DuVal ?• 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ..-)- day of April, 
1993. 
J2fy ^ 
^NOTARY P^B^IC „ 
^ Residing- a t : Prfri^ , ^ ' i 
My commission Expires: 
1
 \ ••'..• f • ,iu-rrrij>.i;i 
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1 is that right? 
2 A That's just what I said, yes. Yes. 
3 Q There's not just the beginning and the end of 
4 the accident, but also between the time Colovich gets 
5 there and Kennedy gets there or -
6 A Right. 
7 Q Colovich and the truck? 
8 A Right. There's just no way of knowing what 
9 the time frames were between the events as they arrived 
10 on the scene. 
11 Q With regard to the vehicles that were present 
12 at the accident, could you tell me the sequence in which 
13 the vehicles arrived, who got there second and who got 
14 there third? 
15 A Yes, I believe so. I believe I can. Would 
16 you like me to go through it? 
17 Q Sure. 
18 A Okay. Gilbert obviously is the initial 
19 vehicle. Then Kennedy comes along and sees Gilbert, 
20 swerves and hits the guardrail. And then apparently -
21 and now this was told to me, I did not read it, a 
22 statement by Kennedy, but apparently she indicated that 
23 she jumped the guardrail to get out of the way when she 
24 saw the 18-wheeler truck coming along. 
25 Q Now, when you say you had a conversation with 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
1 Adamson or Colovich in the Buick is - the damage on the 
2 front of the Buick and the back of the Jeep from that 
3 collision is sufficient to have propelled the Jeep 
4 forward with enough velocity to do what it did to Clark, 
5 by throwing him over the guardrail. 
6 Q And I take it at this point in time you don't 
7 know the distance that Brad Clark was thrown over that 
8 guardrail, whether he was one foot next to the guardrail 
9 or 12 feet from the guardrail? 
10 A That's correct, I don't have any information 
11 on that at all. 
12 Q And at this point in time you can't tell the 
13 speeds of any of the vehicles; is that right? 
14 A That's right, yes. 
15 Q Did I hear you incorrectly earlier with regard 
16 to the Holbrook vehicle? I thought earlier you told me 
17 that you thought either Colovich or Holbrook was more 
18 likely than Woolstenhulme, but now I'm hearing you narrow 
19 it down to Colovich. I'm wondering if I'm hearing you 
20 right or not. 
21 A Well, I'm thinking in terms of vehicles, not 
22 the drivers, and I told you that it was either the Buick 
23 or the Cherokee that were most likely to have hit -
24 Q Okay. 
25 A - Clark. And when you think about it, if 
I ROCKY MOUNTAIN Rr$)RTING SERVICE, INC. 
1 her, is that -
2 A No. I'm saying that I have not even read her 
3 witness statement, if she did so, if she made such a 
4 statement Tm saying this was told to me by other 
5 people. So all I'm going on is what I've been told and I 
6 can't say this is the document where I learned this. 
7 Q Okay. 
8 A Okay. Then MacArthur was on the left side and 
9 to the rear of the 18-wheeler and was cut off by the 
10 18-wheeler, so she fishtails and spins and winds up 
11 bouncing off the guardrail. Then Woolstenhulme comes 
12 along, saw the semi cut off MacArthur and he hit - first 
13 he hit Gilbert's car, then he runs into MacArthur's car. 
14 Then Adamson comes along and hits the Jeep and is, in 
15 turn, hit by Colovich. And when - as Colovich hits the 
16 Jeep, that is, from our viewpoint, the most likely time 
17 that Cark gets hit by the Jeep. And then Holbrook 
18 comes along and slides into the side of the Woolstenhulme 
19 truck, and that's the last car to be directly involved in 
20 the pileup. 
21 Q And on what facts do you base your 
22 determination that Colovich or Holbrook are more likely 
23 involved in the striking of Brad Clark than Adamson? 
24 A Because Adamson comes along earlier and didn't 
125 hit the Jeep hard enough to push the Jeep into Clark, but 
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1 Cark had been hit first by the Buick before the Buick 
2 hit the Cherokee, then it's likely that he would have 
3 been pushed into the Cherokee and perhaps even crushed 
4 between the - between the Buick and the Cherokee. So 
5 that would make it more probable that it was the Cherokee 
6 that hit him. But even that is not a solid conclusion. 
7 It's based on the highest probability from the 
8 information that's available. 
9 Q Okay. Maybe - let me ask you, if I can put 
10 this into layman's terms, so I know that I am 
11 understanding you as well. Basically, you disagree with 
12 Mr. Duvail in Duvail's opinion that it was more likely 
13 Woolstenhulme, right? 
14 A The Cherokee? 
15 Q Woolstenhulme is the pickup truck. 
16 A I see, I see what you're saying. I 
17 misunderstood you. I don't think it could have been 
18 Woolstenhulme because he was too far out in the road. It 
19 would have required a much greater angle of impact for 
20 him to have bumped Qark and caused Qark to fly over the 
21 guardrail. Because, as I said earlier, a vehicle 
22 traveling in one direction has a very difficult time 
23 hitting something and knocking it in any direction but 
24 the direction the vehicle is traveling, 
25 Q Okay. So you think it is more likely that it 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN RE^RTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 is either Adamson in the Jeep or Colovich in the Buick; 
2 is that right? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q But as you sit here today, you don't know 
5 which; is that right? 
6 A I'd say the higher probability is the Jeep, 
7 but Vm not certain. I can't say for sure. 
8 Q And I take it that you can't say for sure that 
9 it wasn't - well, other than the MacArthur vehicle in 
10 which Brad Clark was actually riding, we know it wasn't 
11 him or anything that got to the accident before that car? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q We do know that for certain? 
14 A Yes, that is very logical. 
15 Q And then would it be true that after the 
16 MacArthur vehicle, you don't know for certain of any of 
17 the following vehicles? 
18 A Well, yeah, not for certain, but let's face 
19 it, we have the Jeep and the Buick parked on the east 
20 side of the road. And if any of the other vehicles that 
21 came through had hit Clark, it would have been the same 
22 kind of phenomena that it would have been necessary to 
23 occur had Woolstenhulme been the one to have hit Clark. 
24 They all had to be much farther, at least 10 feet west of 
25 the guardrail as they went by, because they couldn't have 
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1 went wrong, either his driving ability, his speed, or 
2 something went wrong because he went into a spin and 
3 wound up crosswise in the number 2 lane in the right side 
4 emergency lane and came to a stop. I mean, that has to 
5 be a share of fault in starting the chain of events, but 
6 certainly not the entire fault. 
7 Q (BY MR. PETERSEN) And could you tell me, can 
8 you list anything in particular that you believe Gilbert 
9 did or didn't do which he should have done or should not 
10 have done? 
11 A Failed to maintain control of his car. 
12 Q Anything else? 
13 A I don't have any more information than that. 
14 Q How about Kennedy? 
15 A I don't have any information about the 
16 distance between Kennedy and Gilbert as they traveled on 
17 the road before they got to the accident location, so I 
18 can't say that Kennedy was following too close. I can't 
19 say that Kennedy was going too fast. It's apparent that 
20 Kennedy didn't see Gilbert early enough to be able to 
21 steer around him without losing control. Therefore, it 
22 follows that Kennedy either was non-observant or was 
23 going too fast, or both. 
24 Q Did the presence of the Kennedy vehicle after 
25 it came to rest present any sort of problem in 
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1 gone through the Jeep or the Buick, so that just becomes 
2 a law of deduction. 
3 Q Okay. And if the speeds of the following 
4 vehicles are greater, theoretically they can propel Brad 
5 Clark's body farther, is that right? 
6 A Correct Except they would have not propelled 
7 him to the left, they would have propelled him straight 
8 down the road and he would have landed in the middle of 
9 the road farther down the highway rather than off to the 
10 side as he did At least, as I understand he did. 
11 Q Do you have any opinion with regard to any 
12 vehicle coming after Holbrook? 
13 A As to what? 
14 Q As to any participation in the accident. 
15 A I don't know whether other vehicles came 
16 through the area or not that were not involved in the 
17 accident and, therefore, were not recorded. 
18 Q I'd like to take each of these people in turn 
19 and ask you if you have any opinions with regard to their 
20 actions or omissions. First, Gilbert, do you have any 
21 opinions with regard to Gilbert? 
22 MR.ZACCHEO: You're asking about faults? 
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
24 MR. PETERSEN: Yes. 
25 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Obviously, something 
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1 maneuvering of the vehicles that came afterwards? 
2 A Not nearly as much as Gilbert, but certainly 
3 the presence of a car there creates a hazard and 
4 something to be aware of. 
5 Q Are you aware of any other fault where the 
6 acts or omissions on the part of Gilbert -
7 MR. JEFFS: Gilbert or Kennedy? 
8 MR. PETERSEN: Tm sorry. Gilbert Thank 
9 you. 
10 THE WITNESS: I don't have enough information 
11 to be able to say. 
12 Q (BY MR. PETERSEN) How about with regard to 
13 the 18-wheeler? 
14 A Well, I described the decision-making process 
15 of the 18-wheeler and it appears that the driver can be 
16 credited with being wise in not running into Gilbert and 
17 opting to cause MacArthur more problems. Beyond that, he 
18 managed to get his rig through the accident location 
19 without contacting anything, so the fact that he did what 
20 he did would indicate that if he was able to do it, 
21 others should have been able to do it, also. 
22 Q Am I to take from that that you do not 
23 attribute any fault to the semi truck? 
24 A No, no, that's not correct I would say that, 
25 once again, with the weather conditions what they were, 
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